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extra.’”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The words “shall not be assigned” probably ought to ask for a 
raise based on the amount of work they have performed in 
American courts.  Parties often use such a phrase in contract 
clauses prohibiting the parties from transferring their contractual 
rights to third parties in a transaction known as an assignment.2  
Courts have agreed on very little concerning the form and effects 
of anti-assignment clauses,3 other than the general rule that such 
clauses are valid unless either the contract itself or a statute dictates 
otherwise.4  In a contract, the innocent-looking words “shall not be 
assigned” may have at least three different meanings, depending on 
the court and the context.5  As one commentator remarked, 
“Unfortunately . . . the law on the subject is in a very confused 
state.”6  Apparently, the courts have been working these words 
particularly hard. 
In the recent decision Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood,7 
the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the question of how it 
would interpret the words of an anti-assignment clause.8  The court 
concentrated on enforcing the plain language of the contract, 
holding that as long as something in the contract demonstrated the 
parties’ intent that the contractual rights would not be assignable, 
the attempted assignment will be ineffective.9  This stance 
represents a break from the trend in other jurisdictions toward 
construing such clauses strictly because they act as restraints on 
 
 1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 
197 (Western Pub. Co. 1986) (1871). 
 2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (1981) (“An 
assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor’s intention to transfer it by 
virtue of which the assignor’s right to performance by the obligor is extinguished 
in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance.”); 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “assignment” as “[t]he 
transfer of rights or property”). 
 3. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 138, at 931 (4th 
ed. 2001) (explaining that courts have shown confusion on the subject). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
 5. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 6. Grover C. Grismore, Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract, 31 
MICH. L. REV. 299, 300 (1933). 
 7. 683 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2004). 
 8. Id. at 269. 
 9. Id. at 272-74. 
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alienation.10 
This Case Note first examines the history of anti-assignment 
clauses, three approaches courts use to interpret anti-assignment 
clauses, and Minnesota’s prior case law on the subject.11  Next, it 
details the Travertine decision,12 critiques the court’s reasoning in 
that case, and examines the policy implications of the court’s 
holding.13  The Case Note concludes that the court’s analysis 
disregards some subtleties of case law and implications of policy in 
reaching an inflexible standard of interpretation, instead of 
following the modern trend toward strict construction of anti-
assignment clauses.14  Because of this, Travertine may cause 
inconsistencies in future cases, while denying Minnesota citizens 
the benefits of the modern majority rule. 
II.  HISTORY 
The history of non-assignment clauses in Anglo-American law 
demonstrates a “basic tension between freedom of contract 
principles and concerns about restraints on alienation.”15  Although 
most cases demonstrate a trend toward imposing fewer restrictions 
on assignments, courts have been pulled between the two 
competing principles over the years and approaches vary based on 
the jurisdiction and the circumstances.16 
A.  Three Approaches 
Under medieval common law, anti-assignment clauses were 
entirely unnecessary.  Assignments were not allowed because 
contract rights were viewed as personal to the contracting parties.17  
This rule made sense in a society where defaulting debtors faced 
 
 10. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Selling Structured Settlements: The Uncertain Effect of 
Anti-Assignment Clauses, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 787, 795-96 (2001) (stating the favored 
approach to anti-assignment clauses “minimize[es] their restraint on alienation 
consequences by interpreting them whenever reasonably possible as only imposing 
a duty not to assign and not rendering this attempted assignment ineffective”); see 
also infra Part II.A.2. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. Crespi, supra note 10, at 794. 
 16. Id. 
 17. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 11.2, at 781 
(Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001); MURRAY, supra note 3, § 135, at 913. 
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severe penalties and credit was infrequently used; attempts to 
assign were viewed suspiciously, “as tending to encourage 
litigation.”18  During the seventeenth century, however, courts 
started to enforce assignments, albeit grudgingly.19  First, the courts 
allowed assignees to bring suits in the assignor’s name, but this 
right was “fragile” because it was lost if the assignor revoked it, 
died, or went bankrupt.20  Eventually, the courts of law followed the 
chancery courts’ lead in granting assignees greater rights, 
recognizing that if they did not, plaintiffs would simply go to the 
chancellor to obtain the desired result.21 
By the late 1800s, courts regularly held contract rights freely 
assignable, unless the terms of the contract indicated otherwise.22  
The Restatement (First) of Contracts promulgated this view: “A right 
may be the subject of effective assignment unless . . . the 
assignment is prohibited by the contract creating the right.”23  This 
view is now undisputed, unless a specific statute dictates the 
contrary.24  Courts, however, have not agreed on how to determine 
when a contract has effectively prohibited assignment.25  Three 
approaches to interpreting the clauses are used by most courts.  
The first approach holds that assignments made in violation of an 
anti-assignment clause are invalid;26 the second approach considers 
assignments breaches of the contract, unless specific words are 
used to make the assignment invalid;27 and the third approach 
upholds any assignment, rendering the anti-assignment clause 
ineffective.28 
1.  Early Approach—Assignments Are Void 
In cases dating back to the 1890s, some courts have held anti-
assignment provisions destroyed parties’ very ability to assign their 
 
 18. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 11.2, at 781. 
 19. Id. at 782. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 783. 
 22. See, e.g., LaRue v. Groezinger, 24 P. 42, 43 (Cal. 1890); Devlin v. New York, 
63 N.Y. 8, 17 (1875). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1932). 
 23. See Grismore, supra note 6, at 299. 
 25. See MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931 (listing three ways to interpret anti-
assignment clauses); Crespi, supra note 10, at 794-95 (listing four ways). 
 26. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 27. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 28. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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contractual rights.29  Thus, any attempted assignments were void 
and not breaches of the original contract,30 although the rule did 
not prevent the purported assignee from maintaining rights against 
the assignor.31  In the recent case Parrish Chiropractic Centers, P.C. v. 
Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,32 the Supreme Court of Colorado 
held a non-assignment clause stating that interest in the contract 
might not be assigned without written consent eliminated the 
insurance policy holders’ ability to assign their policy benefits.33  As 
the court wrote, “[T]he public policy in favor of the freedom of 
contract, and the corollary right of the insurer to deal only with the 
party with whom it contracted, outweigh the general policy favoring 
 
 29. See Burck v. Taylor, 152 U.S. 634, 655 (1894); Tabler, Crudup & Co. v. 
Sheffield Land, Iron & Coal Co., 79 Ala. 377, 378-80 (1885) (holding labor tickets 
which had the words “not transferable” on them could not be assigned by 
employees who received them for the labor they had done); Behrens v. Cloudy, 97 
P. 450, 451 (Wash. 1908) (holding attempted assignment by a lessee of an option 
to purchase “confer[red] no benefits on the assignee” because of a contract clause 
under which the lessee agreed not to “assign this lease or any part thereof without 
. . . written consent”).  For modern cases, see, e.g., Kent General Hospital, Inc. v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Del., Inc., 442 A.2d 1368, 1370-72 (Del. 1982) 
(holding an anti-assignment clause that stipulated “payment shall not be 
assignable without the written approval of [Blue Cross]” allowed Blue Cross not to 
honor assignments of health insurance benefits made by its insureds to Kent 
General Hospital); Augusta Medical Complex, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Kan., Inc., 634 
P.2d 1123, 1125, 1127 (Kan. 1981) (holding an anti-assignment clause providing 
that “benefits of the Contract . . . are not assignable” was “valid and enforceable” 
by Blue Cross); Cloughly v. NBC Bank-Seguin, N.A., 773 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex. 
App. 1989) (concluding an anti-assignment clause stating that the “Seller shall not 
have the right to make any assignment . . . without the prior written consent of the 
Purchaser” made an attempted assignment invalid). 
 30. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931; see supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. 
 31. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 242 B.R. 767, 771 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999) (“[T]he 
anti-assignment clause is to be construed ‘for the benefit of the obligor, and not to 
prevent the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor.’” (quoting Fox-
Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros. Inc., 452 F.2d 1346, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 
1971))); Garden State Bldgs., L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315, 1322 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“An anti-assignment clause protects the obligor 
and does not affect the transaction between the assignor and the assignee.”); In re 
Kaufman, 37 P.3d 845, 855 (Okla. 2001) (“[A]n assignor of a contract containing a 
valid anti-assignment provision may not invoke the clause as against its assignee.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(c) (1981) (“A contract term 
prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different intention is 
manifested . . . is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not prevent the assignee 
from acquiring rights against the assignor . . . .”). 
 32. 874 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1994). 
 33. Id. at 1051, 1054. 
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the free alienability of choses in action.”34  Under this approach, 
the words used in the anti-assignment clause matter little.  As long 
as the contract “prohibits assignment in ‘very specific’ and 
‘unmistakable terms’ the assignment will be void against the 
obligor.”35  Cases from several jurisdictions—for example, 
Colorado36 and Washington37—still follow this approach, refusing 
to enforce assignments made in violation of an anti-assignment 
clause, regardless of the wording of the prohibition. 
2.  Modern Approach—Assignments Are Breaches of the Contract 
Some courts have distinguished between the right to assign and 
the power to assign, holding that generally-worded anti-assignment 
clauses destroy the right but not the power.38  In other words, a 
person who signs a contract with a provision saying rights “shall not 
be assigned” retains the ability, or the power, to make a valid 
assignment, but the clause eliminates the person’s right to do so 
without breaching the contract.  Under this theory, the non-
assignment clause is merely a promise creating a duty not to 
assign.39  Thus, when the assignor breaches this duty, the obligor 
will be able to sue for breach, but the assignor’s rights under the 
assignment will have passed validly to the assignee.40  This means a 
promise not to assign, like most other contractual promises, is not 
self-executing; a court order for specific performance would be 
needed to make the promisee fulfill the promise, rather than pay 
for any damages caused by breaching it.41  In early cases, courts 
often followed this approach in special situations—for leases,42 land 
 
 34. Id. at 1054. 
 35. Portland Elec. & Plumbing Co. v. City of Vancouver, 627 P.2d 1350, 1351 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding an anti-assignment clause that said the plaintiff 
contractor “shall not assign” the contract “without the prior written approval” 
prevented the contractor from assigning a claim for non-payment by the city); see 
also Parrish Chiropractic, 874 P.2d at 1055 (“When a contractual provision is clear 
and unambiguous, courts should neither rewrite it nor limit its effect by a strained 
construction.”). 
 36. Parrish Chiropractic, 874 P.2d at 1054. 
 37. Portland Elec., 627 P.2d at 1351. 
 38. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931; Crespi, supra note 10, at 795. 
 39. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931; Crespi, supra note 10, at 795. 
 40. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 138, at 931. 
 41. See Grismore, supra note 6, at 303 (“It is extremely difficult to see why 
such a promise, more than any other, should be made self-executing.”). 
 42. Id. at 303 (listing lease cases including Garcia v. Gunn, 51 P. 684 (Cal. 
1897); Randol v. Tatum, 33 P. 433 (Cal. 1893); and Den v. Post, 25 N.J.L. 285 
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sales,43 and assignments of the right to receive payment.44 
An increasing number of courts are following this second 
approach, holding assignments effective as long as the contract’s 
non-assignment clause does not expressly take away the parties’ 
power to assign or state that attempted assignments would be 
invalid.45  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts propounds this 
approach: “A contract term prohibiting assignment of rights under 
the contract, unless a different intention is manifested . . . gives the 
obligor a right to damages for breach of the terms forbidding 
assignment but does not render the assignment ineffective.”46  In 
the recent case Rumbin v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.,47 the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut examined several dozen cases and concluded 
the majority of jurisdictions followed this rule, which the court 
called the “modern approach.”48  This rule, the court explained, 
 
(1855)). 
 43. Id. at 303-04 (discussing land contract cases including Hull v. Hostettler, 
194 N.W. 996 (Mich. 1923) and Grigg v. Landis, 21 N.J. Eq. 494 (1870)). 
 44. See Portuguese-Am. Bank of S.F. v. Welles, 242 U.S. 7 (1916); State St. 
Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 177 N.E. 702 (Ill. 1931), noted in Grismore, supra 
note 6, at 306. 
 45. See, e.g., Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite, Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Cedar Point Apts., Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 
1982); Garden State Bldgs., L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315, 1321 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see also Crespi, supra note 10, at 794 (“[I]n recent years 
. . . the adverse consequences of restraints on alienation have become better 
appreciated.”). 
 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(b) (1981). 
 47. 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000). 
 48. Id. at 533.  The Rumbin court’s list of cases supporting the modern rule 
included opinions applying law from the following eleven states:  Arizona 
(Hanigan v. Wheeler, 504 P.2d 972 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)), California (Randol v. 
Tatum, 33 P. 433, 433 (Cal. 1893)), Delaware (Paccom Leasing Corp. v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., Civ. A. Nos. 89-255-CMW, 90-311-CMW, 1991 WL 226775, 
at *7 (D. Del. Oct. 30, 1991)), Florida (In re Freeman, 232 B.R. 497 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1999)), Illinois (Lomas Mortgage U.S.A., Inc. v. W.E. O’Neil Constr. Co., 812 
F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1993)), Michigan (Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1998)), Missouri (Cedar Point Apts., 693 F.2d at 
754), New Jersey (Bel-Ray Co., 181 F.3d at 442), New York (Allhusen v. Caristo 
Constr. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1952)), Utah (U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross 
& Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 1988)), and Vermont (Grieve v. Gen. Am. 
Life Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Vt. 1999)).  Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 532-35.  
Decisions from Texas are split:  The court in Rumbin listed one as following the 
modern approach (Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612, 615 
(Tex. App. 1985)) and another as backing the older rule that holds assignments 
invalid regardless of the language in the anti-assignment clause (Cloughly v. NBC 
Bank-Seguin, N.A., 773 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex. App. 1989)).  Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 
532-34. 
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“offers the advantage of free assignability together with full 
protection for any obligor who actually suffers damages as a result 
of an assignment,” because the obligor would be able to sue the 
assignor for any losses that in fact resulted.49  The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts also explains that concern about restraints on 
alienation is the basis for its rule for interpreting anti-assignment 
clauses: “[T]he policy which limits the validity of restraints on 
alienation has been applied to the construction of contractual 
terms open to two or more possible constructions.”50 
But courts have been inconsistent in deciding when a non-
assignment clause sufficiently manifests an intention to make the 
assignment invalid.51  Some courts make distinctions based on the 
precise wording of the non-assignment clause, requiring the 
contract to expressly state that attempted assignments are “void” or 
“invalid” before  voiding the assignment.52  A subset of these courts 
also will invalidate assignments if the contract asserted that the 
“power to assign” was precluded.53  Other jurisdictions follow an 
approach suggested by a Restatement (Second) comment, which states 
the decision depends on “all the circumstances.”54  The comment 
explains that courts may need to examine other factors because the 
same words may have different meanings depending on their 
context; for example, “‘[n]ot transferable’ has a clear meaning in a 
theater ticket; in a certificate of deposit the same words may refer 
 
 49. Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 534. 
 50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. a (1981). 
 51. Crespi, supra note 10, at 796-97. 
 52. E.g., Garden State Bldgs., L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315, 1321 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding assignment invalid because the clause 
said assignments without consent “shall be void”); Univ. Mews Assocs. v. 
Jeanmarie, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (explaining the anti-assignment 
clause “must contain express provisions that any assignment shall be void or 
invalid if not made in a certain specified way”). 
 53. Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 630, 
638 (D. Md. 2000) (holding anti-assignment clause that took away the power to 
assign made assignment invalid); Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 (same); Rumbin, 
757 A.2d at 535 (holding assignment valid because the contract did not expressly 
limit power to assign). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. c (1981); see also Bank 
of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts section 322, comment c, and holding assignment invalid after 
considering the alternative remedy, a claim for breach of contract); Henderson v. 
Roadway Express, 720 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding the 
assignment invalid because the anti-assignment clause was a “bargained-for 
provision that was intended to benefit all parties”). 
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to negotiability rather than assignability.”55  Despite the 
inconsistency, most of the courts that have recently considered the 
issue have followed one of the forms of the modern approach.56 
3.  Statutory Approach—Anti-Assignment Clauses Are Invalid 
The third approach holds anti-assignment clauses themselves 
ineffective.  Under this theory, such clauses neither invalidate 
assignments57 nor create a cause of action for breach of contract;58 
instead, all contract terms are assignable.  This approach is limited 
to contracts that fall under statutes covering particular situations 
and is prompted by the same concerns about restrictions on 
alienation that inform the “modern approach” to anti-assignment 
clauses. 
One of the most widely used examples of an anti-assignment 
statute is contained in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
which has been adopted in almost all jurisdictions.59  Section 406 of 
Article 9 invalidates terms that restrict or prohibit assignments of 
accounts,60 which are payment obligations arising from regular 
commercial transactions61 for both “goods sold” and “services 
rendered.”62  A comment in the Code states that the provision 
“build[s] on common-law developments that essentially have 
eliminated legal restrictions on assignments of [certain] rights to 
payment.”63 
State and federal statutes with similar effects cover a variety of 
situations.  Assignments of wages to creditors, with a few 
 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. c (1981). 
 56. Rumbin, 757 A.2d at 535. 
 57. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-406(d)(1) (2000) (stating “a term in an agreement 
between an account debtor and an assignor” that prohibits assignment is 
ineffective). 
 58. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-406(d)(2) (2000) (stating “a term in an agreement 
between an account debtor and an assignor” that an assignment may give rise to a 
breach is ineffective). 
 59. Crespi, supra note 10, at 792. 
 60. U.C.C. § 9-406(d).  For exceptions see U.C.C. § 9-109(d) (2000). 
 61. Crespi, supra note 10, at 792. 
 62. U.C.C. § 9-106 (2000); see also Knecht Bros. v. Ames Constr., Inc., 404 
N.W.2d 859, 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (applying Minnesota Statutes section 
336.9-318(4), then Minnesota’s version of U.C.C. section 9-406(d), to determine 
that a subcontractor for a seeding project could assign its rights to payment from 
the general contractor to its financiers, despite an anti-assignment clause in the 
contract). 
 63. U.C.C. § 9-406 cmt. 5 (2000). 
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exceptions, are prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Creditor Practices Rule.64  Many states have similar rules, often 
based on a provision from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.65  
These rules are based on the recognition that such assignments 
interfere with employment, disrupt family finances, and deny 
debtors a chance to defend themselves before their wages are 
subject to collection.66  Some states decided that rights to the 
payment of money always should be assignable; for example, an 
Arkansas statute states that all written agreements for the payment 
of money or property “shall be assignable,”67 a statement the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held invalidated an anti-assignment 
clause in a health insurance contract.68  And under federal 
bankruptcy law, a trustee in bankruptcy has the ability to assign an 
executory contract or lease despite an anti-assignment restriction.69 
Despite these examples, the applications of this approach 
remain restricted.  Courts have not been willing to flout the 
common law acceptance of anti-assignment clauses by holding 
clauses invalid in the absence of statutes specifically invalidating the 
clauses. 
B.  Mixing Approaches 
Over the centuries, courts’ general position on the assignment 
of contract rights has rotated 180 degrees, from the days when 
assignments were not recognized at all to the current proliferation 
of statutes that stop parties from preventing assignments.  But the 
 
 64. MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 11:5 (2006). 
 65. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.305(1) (1974) (“A creditor may not 
take an assignment of earnings of the consumer for payment or as security for 
payment of a debt arising out of a consumer credit transaction.  An assignment of 
earnings in violation of this section is unenforceable by the assignee of the 
earnings and revocable by the consumer.”).  Many states have adopted laws on this 
topic.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-43-304 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-3-305 
(1995); MINN. STAT. § 181.05 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 2-410 (2004); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-14-334 (2005). 
 66. PRIDGEN, supra note 64, at § 11:5.  Such provisions may interfere with 
employment by leaving an employee with little incentive to perform adequately: 
“From the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not 
earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.”  Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 245 (1934). 
 67. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-58-102 (West 2005). 
 68. Am. Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 773 S.W.2d 831, 834 
(Ark. 1989). 
 69. 11 U.S.C.S. § 365(f)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). 
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overall march toward free assignability has not been without many 
meanderings and detours.  Approaches vary significantly between 
jurisdictions, and in any particular case, the court’s decision 
depends as much on the policies it wishes to promote under those 
specific circumstances as on the jurisdiction’s overall approach. 
For example, in cases involving assignments of payments from 
tort victims’ structured settlements, some courts are particularly 
willing to hold assignments invalid when made in contravention of 
an anti-assignment clause because of the desire to protect the tort 
victim.70  Several courts also have concluded that assignments of 
health insurance benefits should be invalidated because the anti-
assignment clauses in the health insurance contracts supported the 
compelling public policy of controlling the growth of medical 
costs.71  Thus, the rule for anti-assignment contracts is anything but 
consistent; the case law is filled with quirks and caveats that depend 
on the wording of the contract, any applicable statutes, and 
possibly public policies, apart from the general approach adopted 
by the state. 
C.  Minnesota Case Law 
In Minnesota, case law on the subject of anti-assignment 
clauses is limited;72 until recently, Minnesota’s courts apparently 
had not adopted any of the interpretive approaches for general 
use.  In Wilkie v. Becker,73 the court stated a right to payment of 
money could be assigned “unless there is something in the terms of 
 
 70. See, e.g., Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 
2d 630, 633-34 (D. Md. 2000) (determining that no Missouri cases specifically 
address the assignment of a right to payments under a structured settlement; 
considering other states’ structured settlement cases instead of looking to Missouri 
cases that addressed other anti-assignment clauses in general).  For a detailed 
analysis of structured settlement cases, see infra notes 160-166 and accompanying 
text. 
 71. See, e.g., St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., 810 
F. Supp. 1209, 1220 (D. Kan. 1992); Parrish v. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. 
Servs. Co., 754 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Del., Inc., 442 A.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Del. 1982).  In 
these cases, insureds had attempted to assign benefits from their health insurance 
contracts to medical providers who did not have contracts with the insurance 
company.  These assignments eliminated any incentive for those providers to enter 
contracts with the insurance company, contracts that would limit the amount the 
providers could charge for services. 
 72. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004). 
 73. 268 Minn. 262, 128 N.W.2d 704 (1964). 
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the contract manifesting the intention of the parties that it shall 
not be assigned.”74  However, the court did not specify what terms 
were needed to qualify as that “something” manifesting intention, 
or what the effects on the parties would be if that “something” were 
included.  Three decades later, in Vetter v. Security Continental 
Insurance Co.,75 the court repeated the general rule that assignments 
were allowed “in the absence of a contractual provision to the 
contrary,”76 again without specifying what that provision ought to 
say or how it should be interpreted.  Reflecting the general 
confusion in this area, recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions 
involving anti-assignment provisions followed each of the first two 
approaches.  In S O Designs USA, Inc. v. Rollerblade, Inc.,77 the court 
assumed an assignment in violation of an anti-assignment clause 
was valid;78 but in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Mount Sinai Hospital,79 
the court held the attempted assignment was not effective until the 
anti-assignment clause was waived.80 
Minnesota also has statutes following the third approach, 
making anti-assignment clauses ineffective under certain 
circumstances.81  Furthermore, case law suggests assignments 
cannot be prohibited in some situations.  In Wilkie, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court stated that the right to receive money due under a 
contract “may be assigned even though the contract itself may not 
be assignable.”82  In another case, the court of appeals suggested 
contracts may not prohibit the right to receive damages for a 
breach of contract.83  Thus, Minnesota has case law that uses all 
 
 74. Id. at 267, 128 N.W.2d at 707. 
 75. 567 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. 1997). 
 76. Id. at 521. 
 77. 620 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 78. Id. at 55. 
 79. No. C7-01-1287, 2002 WL 378129, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2002). 
 80. Id. at *3. 
 81. See MINN. STAT. § 336.9-406 (2004) (Minnesota’s version of U.C.C. § 9-406 
(2000)); MINN. STAT. § 181.05 (2004) (making assignments of unearned wages or 
salary invalid). 
 82. Wilkie v. Becker, 268 Minn. 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1964); see also 
In re Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620, 625 (D. Minn. 1971) (“[I]t is possible under 
Minnesota law to assign the proceeds of a contract even if the contract itself is not 
assignable.”). 
 83. Mears Park Holding Corp. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 281, 284 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“In analyzing anti-assignment provisions, a distinction 
must be drawn between the right to assign performance under a contract, which 
may be prohibited, and the right to receive damages for its breach, which may not 
be prohibited.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(a) 
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three approaches, although no case specifically analyzes and adopts 
a particular position.  Against this confused backdrop, Travertine 
Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood84 arrived on the Minnesota court scene. 
III.  THE TRAVERTINE DECISION 
A.  Facts 
In Travertine, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the anti-
assignment question that had perplexed so many other courts.85  
The case began with James Lennon and George Berkey’s formation 
of a real estate company, Travertine Corp., in 1989.86  Lennon and 
Berkey found investors for the corporation, which then purchased 
960 acres of real estate in California.87  Lennon and Berkey planned 
to prepare the land for residential development and sell it to a 
developer.88  To further that end, Lennon and Berkey signed a 
management agreement with Travertine Corp.,89 which entitled the 
pair to a percentage of Travertine’s net profits from the land sale 
and provided for “reasonable compensation for their services to 
date” if the agreement were terminated.90  The agreement also 
stated that Lennon and Berkey would serve on the corporation’s 
board of directors and as corporate officers, it bound all parties to 
arbitration in case of a dispute, and asserted it would be binding on 
the parties’ “representatives, successors and assigns.”91  The 
contract included a non-assignment clause stating that “the rights 
and obligations of Berkey/Lennon shall not be assignable except 
that Berkey may assign to Lennon or Lennon assign to Berkey such 
 
(1981). 
 84. 683 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2004). 
 85. Id. at 269. 
 86. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp. at 3, Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-
Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 2004) (No. A-03-0210). 
 87. Id.; Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 3, Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-
Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267 (No. A-03-0210). 
 88. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 3. 
 89. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 4. 
 90. Id. at A-32.  The percentage of compensation the managers were entitled 
to receive shrank the longer the land remained unsold.  If the property sold within 
eighteen months, the managers would receive 50%; if it sold between eighteen 
and thirty-six months, 40%; and if the sale took place after thirty-six months, 25%.  
Id. at A-30. 
 91. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 
2004). 
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rights and obligations.”92 
Seven years later, to settle a judgment against him in an 
unrelated matter, Lennon attempted to assign his rights to 
compensation under the management agreement to Lexington-
Silverwood, a Minnesota limited partnership.93  The agreement 
between Lennon and Lexington-Silverwood did not discharge 
Lennon’s personal liability if payment from the assignment were 
not received.94  In May 1998, Lennon delivered an agreement with 
VGS Consulting to sell Travertine’s property for $22.5 million, but 
the deal’s closing date was postponed four times, and the sale was 
finally cancelled.95  According to Lennon, the deal fell apart 
because Travertine’s board of directors made “commercially 
unreasonable” demands on buyers while some of its members were 
offering to buy the property themselves at “a bargain price.”96  In 
1999, Travertine’s board of directors first removed Lennon from 
the board and then terminated him as president, leaving the 
remaining Travertine board members in control of day-to-day 
operations.97  Finally, citing Lennon’s inability to find a “willing and 
qualified buyer,”98 Travertine’s directors and shareholders voted to 
cancel the management agreement in January 2000.99  Travertine 
Corp. had not paid Lennon any proceeds under the management 
agreement because the land had not been sold, and Lennon 
received no compensation upon termination despite the provision 
in the agreement for “reasonable compensation” for services he 
had contributed upon termination.100 
B.  Procedure 
Lexington-Silverwood filed a demand for arbitration, arguing 
Lennon’s assignment entitled the partnership to compensation of 
$3 million to $4.5 million, which Lexington-Silverwood said 
 
 92. Id. at 269-70.  In 1992, Berkey assigned his rights to Lennon.  Id. at 270. 
 93. Id. at 270.  The judgment against Lennon was for $757,774.  Brief of 
Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 5-6, A-39.  Lennon’s stock in 
Travertine Corp. already was subject to liens worth $226,170 when he attempted 
the assignment.  Id. at A-39. 
 94. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 22. 
 95. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 7, A-24. 
 96. Id. at A-26. 
 97. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 6. 
 98. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 2. 
 99. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 7. 
 100. Id.; see Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-21. 
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Lennon had earned by delivering VGS Consulting’s offer.101  
Travertine refused to pay and moved to stay arbitration.102  The trial 
court held Lennon’s assignment was invalid because it was an 
agreement to transfer future compensation, whereas an assignment 
must be a present transfer of rights;103 and even if the assignment 
were valid, it did not include the right to compel arbitration.104  
With the assignment invalid, the trial court granted the motion to 
stay arbitration.105 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the decision.106  The 
court cited Wilkie v. Becker107 for the proposition that the right to 
receive payment could be assigned, unless “something” in the 
contract’s terms showed the parties intended otherwise.108  Because 
no language in the management agreement specifically addressed 
that right,109 the court turned to an Eighth Circuit case, Cedar Point 
Apartments, Ltd. v. Cedar Point Investment Corp., which applied 
Missouri law.110  Cedar Point Apartments adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts’ position on anti-assignment clauses and 
interpreted the provision as requiring specific language limiting 
the power to assign or stating assignments would be void before 
assignments would be held ineffective.111  The Travertine-Lennon 
contract had no such language112 and it expressly contemplated 
assignments when it provided assignees would be bound to its 
terms.113  Therefore, the court decided, the clause did not make the 
 
 101. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-27. 
 102. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Minn. 
2004). 
 103. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-48.  The trial 
court cited Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 504 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1993) in support of this point.  Id. 
 104. Brief of Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at A-49 to A-50. 
 105. Id. at A-50. 
 106. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004). 
 107. 268 Minn. 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1964). 
 108. Travertine, 670 N.W.2d at 447. 
 109. Id. at 447-48. 
 110. Id. at 447 (citing Cedar Point Apts., Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 
F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
 111. Id. at 447-48 (noting that Cedar Point Apartments followed the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts section 322(2)). 
 112. See id. at 448. 
 113. Id.; see also Cedar Point Apts., 693 F.2d at 754 (stating that the contract 
clause binding the parties and their assigns to the contract strongly supported the 
inference that the non-assignment provision was not meant to prohibit the power 
to make assignments). 
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assignment invalid under the Restatement’s approach.114 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, reversed again.115  In 
an opinion written by Justice Russell Anderson, the court 
concluded that regardless of whether the state followed the 
Restatement (Second) position on anti-assignment clauses, the 
Lexington-Silverwood assignment would be invalid.116  First, the 
court considered the Restatement (Second) provision and decided it 
“need not” adopt the rule because “well-established” Minnesota 
precedent on the issue already existed.117  Using Wilkie v. Becker118 
and Vetter v. Security Continental Insurance Co.,119 the court repeated 
the standard used by the court of appeals that there must be 
“something” in the contract showing the parties intended the right 
to receive payment would not be assignable.120  No specific terms 
were required by these cases, the supreme court added, merely 
some indication of the parties’ intent.121  Although relying on the 
same case as the court of appeals, the supreme court reached the 
opposite conclusion; the statement that “the rights and obligations 
of Berkey/Lennon shall not be assignable” qualified as the 
required “something” indicating intent.122  Under Minnesota 
precedent, the court held, Lennon’s ability to assign his rights was 
destroyed, so the assignment was invalid.123 
According to the supreme court, the assignment would have 
been void even under the modern Restatement (Second) approach.124  
The court rejected the interpretation of the Restatement’s provision 
favored by the court of appeals.125  Instead, the court followed 
 
 114. Travertine, 670 N.W.2d at 448. 
 115. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Minn. 
2004). 
 116. Id. at 272, 274. 
 117. Id. at 272 (citing Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1385 
(Pa. 1991) as stating that courts have the “obligation” to refuse to apply a 
Restatement rule that runs contrary to precedent). 
 118. 268 Minn. 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1964). 
 119. 567 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 1997). 
 120. Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 272 (quoting Wilkie, 268 Minn. at 267, 128 
N.W.2d at 707). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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Judge Posner’s analysis from Bank of America, N.A. v. Moglia,126 
which rejected the need for “magic words” such as “power” or 
“invalid” in the non-assignment clause.127  Instead of “impos[ing] 
formulaic restraints” on contract language, the Minnesota court 
held the better approach would be holding assignments void as 
long as assignment was prohibited in “specific and unmistakable 
terms.”128  The language in the Travertine-Lennon contract 
qualified as unmistakable, the court stated: “[I]t is difficult to 
identify a clearer way to communicate an intent to deny a party the 
power to assign than to expressly say so.”129  Thus, under either 
rule, the court held Lexington-Silverwood could not enforce the 
assignment.130 
D.  Case Epilogue 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision that the assignment 
was invalid made it extremely unlikely Lexington-Silverwood could 
recover anything for its $750,000 judgment against Lennon.  Under 
the assignment, Lennon still was responsible for the debt if the 
assigned payments were not delivered,131 but Lennon filed for 
bankruptcy six months after the management agreement was 
cancelled, disclosing $23,000 in assets and $4.2 million in debts.132  
After Lexington-Silverwood lost its bid to enforce the assignment, 
Lennon wanted to proceed against Travertine on his own behalf, a 
 
 126. 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 127. Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 273-74 (quoting Bank of Am., 330 F.3d at 948). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 273-74.  However, the terms of the contract did not expressly deny 
the parties the power to assign; the contract said the “rights . . . shall not be 
assignable . . . .”  Id. at 269. 
 130. Id. at 274.  The supreme court did not discuss whether Minnesota’s 
version of section 9-406(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to the case, 
presumably because the court assumed the situation fell under one of the section’s 
exemptions.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-109(d)(3) (2000) (exempting assignments for claims 
of wages), 9-109(d)(7) (exempting assignments of single accounts to satisfy a pre-
existing debt).  Neither did the court apply Minnesota Statutes section 181.05, 
which makes an assignment of unearned wages or salary void.  The court stated 
the record was “inconclusive” in establishing whether Lennon was Travertine’s 
employee and when he had earned the compensation purportedly assigned to 
Lexington-Silverwood.  Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 270 n.2. 
 131. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 87, at 5-6. 
 132. In re Lennon, Bk. No. BK-S-01-17252-BAM, at 3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 20, 
2005).  Lennon’s debts included the Lexington-Silverwood debt and $2.8 million 
in priority tax claims that would not be discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings.  
Id. at 12. 
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claim he said was worth $15 million.133  The trustee in bankruptcy, 
disagreeing with this “overly optimistic” analysis, settled the claim 
against Travertine for $900,000.134  Lexington-Silverwood protested 
against the settlement to no avail, and it was approved by the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit.135 
In the final analysis, Travertine likely realized a windfall when 
it sold the property, since it did not have to pay anyone the twenty-
five percent it would have owed Lennon under the management 
agreement.136  Lexington-Silverwood, meanwhile, was left with a 
cause of action against a deeply indebted bankruptcy estate, and 
Lennon lost any hope of seeing a benefit from his work for 
Travertine. 
If Lennon’s assignment to Lexington-Silverwood had been 
held valid despite the anti-assignment clause, the situation for 
Lennon would have been equally grim.  Lexington-Silverwood 
would have received any proceeds directly from Travertine, 
bypassing Lennon’s bankruptcy estate.137  Travertine would have 
been able to sue the bankruptcy estate for any damages it incurred 
because of the assignment, but because the assignment merely 
would have forced Travertine to send a check to a different party, a 
viable suit appears unlikely.138  Lexington-Silverwood might have 
been the party with a windfall under this scenario, if the proceeds 
under the management agreement were larger than Lennon’s debt 
to it. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Travertine, the Minnesota Supreme Court reached a 
conclusion backed by numerous cases; anti-assignment clauses 
 
 133. Id. at 4. 
 134. Id. at 4, 14.  The trustee cited Travertine’s possible legal defenses to the 
claim and the likelihood that pursuing the claim would be extremely costly as 
influencing his decision to settle.  Id. at 17. 
 135. Id. at 17. 
 136. See supra note 90. 
 137. See In re Kaufman, 37 P.3d 845, 850-51 (Okla. 2001) (“Valid assignments 
pass the assignor’s title, leaving no interest to be reached by a creditor.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (1981) (explaining that in an 
assignment, the “assignor’s right to performance by the obligor is extinguished . . . 
and the assignee acquires a right to such performance”). 
 138. See Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich. 
1998) (“[T]he obligor, the party obligated to perform, would not suffer any harm 
by a mere assignment of payments under a contract.”). 
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invalidate any assignments attempted in violation of the clause, 
even if the clauses do not specifically state that will be the result.139  
However, the arguments the court used to reach that conclusion 
are flawed and the failure to adopt the more flexible modern 
approach means Minnesota is out of step with other states and 
missing the policy benefits the modern approach provides. 
A.  The Court’s Problematic Assessment of Minnesota Case Law 
The court’s statement that Minnesota’s precedent on the 
validity of anti-assignment clauses was “well-established”140 is 
questionable,141 and this statement provides the underpinning for 
the court’s entire first argument.  Case law holds some evidence 
that the statement is correct.  For example, the supreme court in 
Sauber v. Northland Insurance Co. held an assignment made in 
violation of an anti-assignment clause was void until the insurance 
company consented to the assignment.142  In addition, the court of 
appeals has held in several cases, albeit in conclusory language with 
little analysis, that such assignments were void.143 
However, neither of the cases that the supreme court chose to 
support its analysis in Travertine actually dealt with an anti-
assignment clause.  In Wilkie, the issue was whether a bankrupt 
 
 139. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text. 
 140. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 
2004). 
 141. As the appeals court noted, Minnesota case law on the subject is “limited.”  
Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004). 
 142. 251 Minn. 237, 248, 87 N.W.2d 591, 599 (1958) (“It is of course axiomatic 
that the policy could not be assigned without the consent of the defendant.”).  
However, the clause in question stated an assignment “shall not bind the company 
until its consent is endorsed hereon,” language which might qualify as taking away 
the power to assign.  Id. at 247, 87 N.W.2d at 599. 
 143. See Bank Midwest, Minn., Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 661 N.W.2d 290, 294 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding clause that stated buyer could not assign without 
written permission voided an assignment made without consent), rev’d on other 
grounds by 674 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 2004); Mears Park Holding Corp. v. 
Morse/Diesel, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 281, 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
assignment was invalid because of the non-assignment clause, the personal nature 
of the contract, and the fact that the contract was still executory); Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of Minn. v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. C7-01-1287, 2002 WL 378129, at *4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2002) (“When the terms of the contract provide that it is 
nonassignable, the contract may not be assigned unless the provision is waived.”).  
But see S O Designs USA, Inc. v. Rollerblade, Inc., 620 N.W.2d 48, 55 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2000) (assuming both assignor and assignee were liable for royalty payments 
owed the plaintiff despite the anti-assignment clause). 
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defendant could make valid assignments of the proceeds from an 
upcoming sale of his property.144  In Vetter, the court had to decide 
whether insurance policy holders had agreed to release their 
insurance company from any future liability when the company 
delegated its duties to another insurer.145  Though both decisions 
recited the rule that parties could agree their contract rights were 
not assignable, neither provided guidance about the required form 
or preferred model of interpretation for anti-assignment clauses.146  
Thus, the Travertine decision seems to take the casually recited 
“something” indicating intent suggested by Wilkie147 and turn it into 
an all-encompassing “anything.”  The supreme court’s leap from 
this unspecific recital to a broad rule on a controversial subject is 
troubling.  The court was free to reject the Restatement (Second) 
provision,148 but it could have done so by searching through more 
Minnesota case law and making a more convincing argument for 
adopting the early approach.  Also, nothing in Minnesota case law 
prohibited the court from adopting the Restatement (Second) 
approach, despite the supreme court’s recitation to the contrary.  
The vague language in Wilkie and Vetter, both of which stated that 
assignments were valid unless prohibited, would have been 
consistent with the adoption of the modern approach, which 
defines how assignments may be prohibited.149  In sum, the court 
could have taken the opportunity in Travertine to adopt the modern 
approach for interpreting anti-assignment clauses. 
B.  The Interpretation of the Restatement (Second) Provision 
The court’s reading of Bank of America, N.A. v. Moglia,150 the 
foundation for its interpretation of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts’ rule, seems to neglect the key point of the case.  Judge 
 
 144. Wilkie v. Becker, 268 Minn. 262, 264, 128 N.W.2d 704, 706 (1964). 
 145. Vetter v. Sec. Cont’l Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 1997). 
 146. Id.; Wilkie, 268 Minn. at 267, 128 N.W.2d at 707. 
 147. 268 Minn. at 267, 128 N.W.2d at 707. 
 148. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Minn. 
2004). 
 149. See Vetter, 567 N.W.2d at 521 (explaining a right could be assigned “in the 
absence of a contractual provision to the contrary”); Wilkie, 268 Minn. at 267, 128 
N.W.2d at 707 (stating a right to payment of money could be assigned “unless 
there is something in the terms of the contract manifesting the intention of the 
parties that it shall not be assigned”). 
 150. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2003); see supra 
text accompanying notes 126-130. 
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Posner’s opinion did reject the need to use “magic words” in the 
anti-assignment clause, but it went on to use different criteria to 
establish whether the assignment should be valid.151  Instead of 
examining the precise language, the Moglia opinion considered the 
circumstances of the contract, as suggested by a comment in the 
Restatement.152  The court considered that the assignee had notice of 
the anti-assignment provision and that the alternative remedy, a 
lawsuit for breach of the provision, was untenable153 and decided to 
hold the assignment invalid based on those circumstances.154  The 
circumstances analysis, not the rejection of specific wording, was 
the crux of the case.  In a later opinion, Judge Posner himself cited 
Moglia in a suggestion that an assignment violating an anti-
assignment clause would be invalid if it violated public policy.155  In 
Travertine, by contrast, the supreme court did not examine the 
circumstances of the contract; the court merely rejected the need 
for “magic words” but went no further, finding the parties’ intent 
from the “plain meaning of the words employed.”156 
In addition, all but one157 of the other cases the supreme court 
cited to support its reading of the Restatement (Second) were 
structured settlement cases,158 of which Grieve v. General American 
Life Insurance Co.159 is representative.  A structured settlement is an 
“arrangement for periodic payment of damages established by 
settlement or judgment in resolution of a tort claim,”160 often used 
to compensate severely injured tort victims who need long-term 
 
 151. Moglia, 330 F.3d at 948. 
 152. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 (1981)); see 
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
 153. Because the lawsuit involved a bankruptcy, a lawsuit for breach of the anti-
assignment clause would have had to be filed by the trustee on behalf of the 
general creditors against the trustee as representative of the bankrupt.  Moglia, 330 
F.3d at 948. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Cook, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 333 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 156. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 
2004). 
 157. Parrish Chiropractic Ctrs., P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049, 
1053 (Colo. 1994) (adopting first approach, in which assignments made in 
violation of an anti-assignment clause are always void, based on two public policy 
reasons: freedom of contract and the need to keep down medical costs). 
 158. Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 274 n.3. 
 159. 58 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Vt. 1999). 
 160. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 529 n.3 (Conn. 2000) 
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225f(a)(5) (2004)). 
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support.161  Sometimes, as in Grieve, the tort victim attempts to 
assign the right to future payments from the settlement in return 
for a smaller but immediate lump sum payment because of dire 
financial need.162  In Grieve, the court decided circumstances 
weighed in favor of voiding an assignment of future payments the 
plaintiff was to receive, without regard to the anti-assignment 
clause’s specific language.163  The court based its decision on two 
factors: (1) the tax benefits the insurance company received under 
the structured settlement, which would be obliterated if the 
assignment were upheld;164 and (2) the legislative policy favoring 
such long-term payment plans for the protection of tort victims, a 
policy that would be violated if injured parties could assign their 
benefits “at an exorbitant rate of interest.”165  Thus, the decisions in 
these structured settlement cases, on which the court’s reading of 
the Restatement depends, are based at least partially on the 
circumstances of the case, not the wording of the clause.166 
 
 161. Usually, the defendant (or its assignee) purchases an annuity policy to 
fund the victim’s payments.  See, e.g., J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Callahan, 
649 N.W.2d 695, 696 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing rotary mower accident in 
which victim agreed to settlement of lifetime payments). 
 162. In Grieve, a woman rendered paraplegic in a bicycle accident attempted to 
assign her structured settlement payments of $104,800 over ten years for a lump 
sum payment of $39,862 to pay debts incurred as a result of her frequent 
hospitalizations and inability to work.  58 F. Supp. 2d at 321. 
 163. Id. at 324. 
 164. Id. at 323.  In CGU Life Insurance Co. v. Singer Asset Finance Co., the Georgia 
Court of Appeals explained the tax benefits received by the payor or its assignee 
for buying an annuity out of which it makes payments to the tort victim: “Under 
current Internal Revenue Service regulations, the [payor or its assignee] is eligible 
to have any amounts it receives from the annuity excluded from its gross income 
so long as, among other things, such periodic payments are not ‘accelerated, 
deferred, increased, or decreased by the recipient.’” 553 S.E.2d 8, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 130(c)(2)(B) (1997)).  Should the IRS determine that 
the sale or assignment of future benefits to a third party violates the above-listed 
conditions, such a transfer could jeopardize the tax advantages of the structured 
settlement agreements under IRS regulations.  Payees also receive tax benefits—
they can exclude the payments from their taxable income.  Id. 
 165. Grieve, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 324.  In Grieve, the rate of interest being charged 
was 18.88%, compounded daily.  Id. at 322. 
 166. Other cases cited by the Travertine opinion to support this point include 
Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Stone Street Capital, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 630 (D. Md. 
2000), Johnson v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (C.D. Cal. 
1998), J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Limited Partnership v. Callahan, 649 N.W.2d 695, and 
CGU Life Insurance Co. v. Singer Asset Finance Co., 553 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), 
which all decided that an anti-assignment clause that took away the “power” to 
assign a structured settlement agreement made an assignment invalid based 
upon—among other factors—the possible loss of tax benefits to the payor.  In 
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The circumstances in Travertine do not appear to justify 
holding the assignment invalid.  Neither James Lennon nor 
Travertine would have suffered any particular adverse 
consequences because of the assignment.  Lennon, who assigned 
his compensation to satisfy a judgment, was not being exploited as 
were the structured settlement victims, who were trading the right 
to long-term payments for a much smaller, immediately payable 
lump sum.167  For Travertine Corp., the attempted assignment was 
merely the transfer of a right to receive payment, so the assignment 
would have changed nothing except where Travertine sent the 
check.168  In this situation, some cases have held that assignments of 
such a right could not be invalidated because there was no reason 
to prohibit such transfers.169  As one court wrote, “The rationale 
behind these cases is derived from the implicit recognition that the 
obligor, the party obligated to perform, would not suffer any harm 
by a mere assignment of payments under a contract.”170  Thus, 
under the Moglia “all the circumstances” rule, the circumstances of 
Lennon’s assignment to Lexington-Silverwood would not weigh in 
favor of invalidating the transfer. 
By rejecting both of the standard interpretive approaches to 
the Restatement (Second) provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
eviscerated the modern Restatement rule.  Under the court’s 
reading, the subtleties of the Restatement’s approach were lost; it 
became the same as the broad rule the court created under 
Wilkie.171  This apparently was not the intent of the Restatement’s 
 
addition, all of the cited cases specifically eliminated the parties’ power to assign, a 
wording which, under most courts’ versions of the modern rule, would invalidate 
the assignment.  See Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 535 (Conn. 
2000) (holding assignment was valid because the contract did not expressly limit 
power to assign).  Thus, these cases do not qualify as rejections of the modern 
rule. 
 167. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text. 
 168. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Minn. 
2004).  Tax benefits would not have been at stake in this situation as they were for 
the payors in the structured settlements, when the payees assigned their rights to 
payment.  See supra note 164. 
 169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Am. Med. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 773 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Ark. 1989) (interpreting 
Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-58-102 as invalidating an anti-assignment 
clause in a health insurance contract that attempted to prohibit the assignment of 
a right to receive payment under the contract). 
 170. Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich. 
1998). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 124. 
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drafters who made the change in order to limit restraints on 
alienation,172 and it is not the way the majority of courts have 
interpreted the provision.173 
Again, the supreme court was free, although not bound, to 
reject the Restatement (Second) provision.  Once the court chose to 
analyze the case under the Restatement rule, however, the court 
should have found the assignment valid.174  Under the Cedar Point 
Apartments approach to the Restatement, the words “shall not be 
assignable” do not sufficiently demonstrate intent to make the 
assignment ineffective.175  Under the Moglia approach, the 
circumstances do not justify making the assignment invalid.  No 
policy reasons, as in the structured settlement cases,176 or practical 
impediments, as in Moglia,177 validate the decision to make this 
mere promise self-executing.178 
Thus, the court’s decision creates an apparently clear-cut 
precedent on a difficult point of law, but the case’s legacy is likely 
to be confused because its reasoning is flawed.  The supreme court 
analyzed the case under both the early and modern approaches, 
probably because the court needed to buttress its weak argument 
under Minnesota precedent.179  The court forced the outcome in 
this case to be the same under both the Restatement and early 
approaches, but the two rules should have led to opposite 
 
 172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 cmt. a (1981) (stating 
that courts have applied the policy against restraints on alienation when 
interpreting contractual terms open to more than one construction). 
 173. Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 535 n.10 (Conn. 2000). 
 174. The appeals court, which also applied the Restatement (Second) of Contacts, 
found the assignment valid.  Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 670 
N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 683 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn. 2004). 
 175. 693 F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 1982).  Travertine Corp. attempted to argue 
that the language in the anti-assignment clause actually fulfilled the Cedar Point 
Apartments criteria, but the court did not even address Travertine’s rather feeble 
argument, preserved in its brief: “The language of the non-assignment clause [‘the 
rights and obligations of Berkey/Lennon shall not be assignable’] is much 
broader than that found in Cedar Point . . . .  The language chosen refers to the 
‘rights and obligations’ and serves to prohibit the power to assign.”  Brief of 
Appellant Travertine Corp., supra note 86, at 23.  This argument makes no sense.  
The relevant language is “shall not be assignable,” which is not specific enough to 
trigger invalidation under the modern rule.  Adding the nouns “rights and 
obligations” changes nothing. 
 176. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 41. 
 179. Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Minn. 
2004); see supra Part IV.A. 
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outcomes.180  The court appeared to be unnecessarily closing 
avenues toward the adoption of the modern approach, despite the 
advantages it includes. 
C.  Policy Implications of the Modern Approach 
The true problem with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s snub 
of the modern approach is that the decision ignores the policy 
advantages of the more nuanced rule.  Under the modern rule, the 
burden of a breach falls on the party less likely to sustain an 
injury181 and all parties avoid restraints on alienation, with their 
resulting transaction costs.182  Finally, although an obligor may 
argue that a mere breach of contract is not what it meant to 
bargain for, the modern approach simply enforces the literal 
agreement of the parties, whatever that happens to be.183 
First, whether the assignment is held valid or invalid, the party 
most disadvantaged will be the proper one—the assignor, who 
presumably knew about the anti-assignment clause and attempted 
to transfer rights anyway.  The assignment’s validity merely changes 
which of the other two parties still has cause of action against the 
assignor.  If the assignment is held valid, the obligor will have a 
claim for breach of contract;184 if it is held invalid, the assignee 
will.185 
The obligor often will not be quantifiably harmed by an 
assignment of rights, in an assignment of the right to payment, the 
obligor merely has to pay another party.186  In other circumstances, 
the obligor likely will not be harmed by having to perform its pre-
existing duty for the assignee if the assignor and assignee share 
similar attributes.187  Also, under both the Restatement (First) and 
 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31, 38-40. 
 181. See infra text accompanying notes 184-189. 
 182. See infra text accompanying notes 190-192. 
 183. See infra text accompanying notes 193-195. 
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(b) (1981); see supra note 
40 and accompanying text. 
 185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(c) (1981) (“A contract 
term prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different 
intention is manifested . . . (c) is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not 
prevent the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor . . . .”). 
 186. See Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943 (E.D. Mich. 
1998). 
 187. See Matthew Horowitz, Resolving Performance Bond Exposures Through 
Assignment of Bonded Contracts 4 (Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2004) (unpublished 
document presented at the Fifteenth Annual Northeast Surety and Fidelity Claims 
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Restatement (Second) approaches to assignments, obligors already are 
protected from having to perform if their duty would be materially 
changed by the assignment, even without an anti-assignment 
clause.188  If the obligor is left with a cause of action, a lawsuit likely 
will not be necessary.  For the assignee, however, holding the 
assignment invalid means it loses the benefit of its bargain with the 
assignor and gains merely a cause of action for breach.189  When the 
language of the anti-assignment clause is open to more than one 
interpretation, the modern approach properly leaves the cause of 
action to the party less likely to have an injury to redress. 
Second, allowing assignments freely whenever extra costs will 
not be imposed on the obligor is economically efficient.  An 
assignment of an existing contract saves transaction costs for the 
obligor and the assignee, who otherwise might have to renegotiate 
a contract that already exists in a presumably acceptable form.190  In 
general, restraints on alienation, such as assignments, are 
disfavored because they increase transaction costs, keeping 
 
Conference) (on file with author) (explaining that it would be “difficult” or 
“impossible” to show a loss when rights under a construction contract are assigned 
to a competent replacement; “[t]herefore, while the opportunity exists for a party 
to seek damages for an assignment in a jurisdiction that applies the majority rule, 
the reality is that there will generally be no damages caused by an assignment”). 
 188. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 151(a) (1932) (“A right may be the 
subject of effective assignment unless, (a) the substitution of a right of the 
assignee for the right of the assignor would vary materially the duty of the obligor, 
or increase materially the burden or risk imposed upon him by his contract, or 
impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance . . . .”); see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(a) (1981) (repeating the 
Restatement (First) rule and adding that assignments also are invalid if the 
substitution of the assignee would “materially reduce [the contract’s] value to [the 
obligor]”); see also Cedar Point Apts., Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 
753 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 317(2)(a) when 
explaining an assignment was valid partially because the seller’s duty to convey 
title to real property was not changed by the assignment); Estate of Frantz v. Page, 
426 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Restatement (Second) section 
317(2)(a) when explaining an assignment of a note did not release guarantors 
from their obligations because the evidence did not clearly show the guarantors’ 
risk was materially increased after the assignment). 
 189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2)(c) (1981) (“A contract 
term prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different 
intention is manifested . . . is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not prevent 
the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor . . . .”). 
 190. See Horowitz, supra note 187, at 6 (“An assignment . . .  may obviate the 
need for the obligee to execute any new contract documents.  Drafting new 
contract documents can be time-consuming and contentious . . . .”). 
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property out of the hands of the user to whom it is most valuable.191  
Because the obligor is unlikely to incur extra expense,192 the 
modern approach of enforcing assignments unless the parties 
expressly agreed to invalidate them makes economic sense. 
Finally, the modern approach allows contracting parties who 
truly believe they would be disadvantaged by an assignment to 
bargain for and enforce an anti-assignment clause.  The modern 
approach does not infringe on the parties’ freedom to contract, it 
executes what the parties literally agreed.193  On occasion, the rule 
might upset the expectations of obligors who believed the other 
party did not have the power to assign the contract, but if the 
obligor actually suffered any injury, those damages still would be 
recoverable.194 
This rule is more equitable not only in the abstract, but also as 
applied to Travertine.  Leaving Travertine, not Lexington-
Silverwood, with a cause of action against Lennon for breaching 
the contract would have been a fairer result.  If the assignment had 
been valid, Travertine merely would have had to pay Lexington-
Silverwood whatever it owed Lennon instead of realizing a windfall 
and Lexington-Silverwood would have gained some recompense 
for its judgment against Lennon.195 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Over the years, courts, like Humpty Dumpty, have made the 
words of anti-assignment clauses do a great deal of work, employing 
them in many different meanings.  In Travertine, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court resolved the historical inconsistencies, though it 
 
 191. Richard A. Epstein, Symposium on Law and Economics: Why Restrain 
Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 972 (1985) (“Most voluntary transactions move 
property from lower to higher value uses. . . . [A]ny gratuitous proliferation of the 
number of necessary parties to the transaction [as occurs when restraints on 
alienation are imposed] can only impede the frequency with which these 
transactions take place, creating in the long run substantial losses for the original 
owners.  In addition, there are apt to be substantial losses to third parties as well.  
Voluntary exchanges work for the mutual benefit of both sides, and where these 
are restrained, potential purchasers share in the losses that are held by original 
owners.”). 
 192. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 193. See, e.g., Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612, 615 
(Tex. App. 1985) (“[B]ecause the contract term only forbids assignment; it does 
not render an assignment ineffective.”). 
 194. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
 195. See supra Part III.D.  
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had to stretch its own case law and raze a Restatement provision to 
do so.196  By holding that assignments attempted in violation of a 
“specific and unmistakable” anti-assignment clause would always be 
ineffective, whatever the precise wording of the clause or the 
circumstances, the court appeared to create a firm precedent for 
future cases.197  However, because of the flaws under the surface of 
the court’s reasoning, Travertine’s rule could lead to difficult or 
conflicting results in future cases.198  Nothing in Minnesota case law 
mandated the court’s rejection of the modern approach,199 which is 
followed by a majority of jurisdictions, promoted by the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts,200 and supported by a policy analysis.201  In sum, 
the court could have adopted the modern approach as Minnesota’s 
rule for interpreting anti-assignment clauses and created a 




 196. See supra Part IV. 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 198. See supra Part IV.B. 
 199. See supra Part IV.A. 
 200. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 201. See supra Part IV.C. 
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